Digital Identity Anchor
Please note that this specification is suitable for pre-production pilot implementations.
Artifacts
v0.8.0 Schema and Samples
The JSON schema and sample credential instance for the Digital Identity Anchor are maintained in this repository.
- JSON Schema:
| Schema | Description |
|---|---|
| DigitalIdentityAnchor.json | Full credential schema including the W3C VC envelope and RecognizedEntity subject |
| RecognizedEntity.json | Standalone schema for the RecognizedEntity credential subject |
| RegisteredIdentity.json | Standalone schema for the registration object carried by the subject |
- Sample Instances:
| Sample | Description |
|---|---|
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_smelter_instance.json | Business register anchors the smelter owner DID to a corporate number |
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_mine_instance.json | Mining cadastre anchors the mine operator DID to a facility registration |
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_battery_instance.json | Trademark register anchors the battery manufacturer DID to a registered trademark |
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_accreditation_instance.json | Accreditation body anchors a conformity assessment body, recording the standards and schemes it is accredited against |
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_land_multiregister_instance.json | A registrar that maintains several registers issues a land title registration, with the register identified by register |
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_registrar_mandate_instance.json | That registrar's own DIA, stating the registers it is mandated to maintain |
| DigitalIdentityAnchor_membership_instance.json | A voluntary association anchors the membership of a natural person |
The samples illustrate different register types — business, facility, trademark and accreditation. The first three anchor a DID from the copper-to-battery supply chain to an authoritative registered identity; the fourth shows an accreditation whose scope names the standards the body is assessed against.
Vocabulary and Context
A DIA references the versioned UNTP JSON-LD context alongside the W3C Verifiable Credentials context:
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://vocabulary.uncefact.org/untp/0.8.0/context/"
]
UNTP terms resolve against the UN/CEFACT vocabulary at https://test.uncefact.org/vocabulary/, including the two code lists this credential draws on: registry-type for registerType and control-type for controlType.
The DIA is an implementation of W3C Recognized Entities v1.0, so one implementation can satisfy both UN and W3C conformance. UNTP vocabulary is used only for what Recognized Entities does not define; Relationship to W3C Recognized Entities sets out which terms come from where.
Overview
The Digital Identity Anchor (DIA) credential provides a means to verify the real-world identity of UNTP credential issuers. The issuer.id property of all UNTP credentials is a W3C decentralized identifier (DID), which allows credentials such as Digital Product Passports (DPPs) to be cryptographically verified as genuinely issued by the entity that controls that DID. However, as a self-issued identity, the DID alone does not provide confidence that the issuer is really who they claim to be.
Authoritative identity registers — national business registers, trademark registers, mining cadastres, and similar institutions — exist in most countries and have well-established registration and verification processes. Unfortunately, most of these registers only issue paper or PDF registration certificates that are easily faked and cannot be used for digitally verifiable proof of identity.
The UNTP DIA bridges this gap. It is essentially a digitally verifiable version of a registration certificate, issued by the authoritative register to the registered member. Where the DIA anchors a member DID (its full semantic), a verifier receiving a DPP or other UNTP credential signed under that DID can confirm not only that the credential was issued by the holder of the DID, but also that the controller of the DID is the holder of an authoritative registered identity. A DIA may also be issued without yet anchoring a DID, as a register-signed attestation of registration; see Adoption pathway for registrants without a DID.
Conceptual Model
The Digital Identity Anchor (DIA) is a verifiable credential issued by a trusted authority that attests to a registered identity. Where the DIA anchors a DID, it asserts an equivalence between the member identity as known to the authority (eg a VAT number) and one or more decentralised identifiers (DIDs) held by the member. Before issuing a DIA that anchors a DID, the authority MUST verify DID ownership (eg using DID Auth).
The outcome is that the subject of the DIA (eg the VAT registered business) can prove that they are the registered identity to any other party. In the UNTP context the DIA provides assurance that a DPP (or DCC/DFR/DTE) issuer really is who they say they are. The verification workflow is as follows
- A verifier (eg buyer of an identified product) discovers a DPP for the product and verifies the credential - confirming that the DPP has not been tampered-with, is genuinely issued by party identified by the issuer DID.
- The DID is resolvable to the DID document which contains a link to the DIA in the DID document
serviceendpoint. - The verifier verifies the DIA credential and confirms that the DPP issuer DID matches the
credentialSubject.idof the DIA. - The verifier confirms that the DID of the issuing authority (the authoritative registrar for the jurisdiction) is on the trusted register list.
Where a DIA names an authoritative URI as its subject rather than a DID, the issuer-to-subject cross-check in step three does not apply; the DIA attests to the registration but makes no key-binding claim, so a DPP signed under some DID cannot be bound to that attestation through the DIA alone.
Across register types the credential makes one statement: the issuing registrar attests that the recognized entity is the controller of the registrations listed in the credential. In a business register or a membership register the registration is of the entity itself, so controller and registered thing coincide. In a land, vessel, trademark or licence register they do not — the registered thing is the parcel, the vessel, the mark or the licence, and the entity is its owner, lessee or operator. The subject identifies the controller; each entry in registration identifies a thing the registrar records against that controller, with controlType saying how it is held.
The DIA can also be used for similar trust anchoring purposes such as:
- Accreditation authorities issue DIA to assert that a conformity assessment body is accredited against a given scheme.
- IP Offices issue DIA to assert that a registered party is the genuine owner of a trademark.
- Land registers issue DIA to assert that a regulated party is the owner of a geo-located property.
Design Requirements
The digital identity anchor is designed to meet the following detailed requirements as well as the more general UNTP Requirements
| ID | Name | Requirement Statement | Solution Mapping |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Proof of DID control | credentialSubject.id SHOULD be a DID. Where it is a DID, the DIA issuer MUST establish, by a challenge-response exchange completed before issuance, that the party being anchored controls that DID, so that an impostor cannot have a well-known DID anchored to a registration they do not hold. Where it is the register's own authoritative URI for the entity, the DIA attests to the registration without anchoring any DID and no DID-control proof applies. | Proving control of the DID |
| 02 | DIA Issuer DID | The DIA issuer MUST use a supported DID method (see DID Methods) as the DIA issuer and the domain MUST match the well known domain of the issuing authority so that verifiers can confirm authority identity via public records. | CredentialIssuer.id — the issuer DID in the Credential Envelope |
| 03 | Scheme registration | The DIA issuing authority SHOULD register the identity scheme (including the trusted issuer DIDs) with the UN/CEFACT identifier scheme registry so that verifiers can leverage UN maintained scheme metadata to simplify DIA discovery and verification. | UN GRID for authoritative registers; UNTP implementation registers for others |
| 04 | Multiple DIDs | A registered member may need to link multiple DIDs to one registered ID, either because there is a need to transition between DID service providers or because an organisation may choose to use different DIDs for different purposes. A registrar MUST NOT overwrite, withdraw or revoke an anchor merely because the member's DID has changed, so that credentials signed under a previous DID remain verifiable. | Issue multiple DIAs; Superseding an anchor is not revoking it |
| 05 | Recognition scope | The DIA MUST state the scope of the recognition — what the registrar recognises the member to be, and under what mandate — as one or more resolvable URIs with a human-readable name, so that verifiers can confirm the basis of the registration. | registration.recognitionScope |
| 06 | Register Type | The DIA MUST specify the register type so that verifiers can understand the context of recognitionScope | registration.registerType |
| 07 | W3C profile | The DIA MUST be typed as both DigitalIdentityAnchor and RecognizedEntityCredential, and its credentialSubject as RecognizedEntity, with the UNTP register properties carried in a registration object typed RegisteredIdentity, so that a conforming W3C recognized-entity processor can consume a DIA unchanged. | Relationship to W3C Recognized Entities |
| 11 | Issuer authority | The DIA issuer MUST be the legal entity with the authority to maintain the register — statutory, delegated, or constitutional in the case of a membership body. Not the register as an administrative unit, which has no legal personality, and not a service provider operating infrastructure on the registrar's behalf. | Who Issues DIAs? |
| 12 | Register identified | registration.register MUST identify the register that holds this registration, with a resolvable id, the name the registrar publishes and its registerType. A registrar may maintain several registers, so a verifier MUST NOT infer the register from the issuer. | Registers maintained by one registrar |
| 08 | No amplification | Where a DIA is one link in a delegation chain, a verifier MUST NOT accept a recognition scope broader than the scope held by the issuing registrar for the aspect being tested. | Delegation and non-amplification |
| 09 | DIA Discovery | The DIA SHOULD be discoverable given either the DID or the registeredID | DIA Discovery |
| 10 | White list | The DIA should include a mechanism to avoid malicious actors who are not the registrar from issuing DIAs that claim links to authoritative registered IDs | UN GRID and UNTP implementation registers maintain trusted issuer lists |
The examples below help to clarify the application of Recognition scope, Register Type and No amplification.
Logical Model
The Digital Identity Anchor binds a registered identity to a DID controlled by the registered member. The diagram below shows the registered identity — the credential subject carried inside the credential envelope — and the components it composes. The surrounding W3C Verifiable Credential envelope (issuer, validity, status, rendering) is omitted for clarity; it is shown in full under Credential Schema.
Read it outwards from the credential subject at the centre. The subject is a W3C RecognizedEntity: id is the subject identifier, a DID whose control the registrar proved where present, and legalName or name is what the entity is called. Everything the register asserts hangs off one registration object, typed RegisteredIdentity, whose registeredId is the number the register holds. The register itself is a node of its own, reached through register, carrying the URI the registrar publishes for it, its name and its registerType. The authority operating the register is the credential issuer, so no separate registrar property is carried.
recognitionScope carries what the registrar recognises about the member — the legal form, licence category or classification class, and any standards or schemes the recognition rests on. Each entry may name the scheme it is drawn from, because a registrar commonly publishes several.
Each box is an object; each labelled arrow is a property, with its cardinality (1, 0..1, *) shown at the target end.
Credential Schema
The full JSON Schema for the credential — the W3C Verifiable Credential envelope wrapping the Registered Identity subject — is the working version, a candidate for UNTP v1.0.0.
For detailed class and property definitions, see the Core Vocabulary reference. For implementation details, sample JSON-LD snippets, and register-specific use cases, see The Components of a DIA below.
Relationship to W3C Recognized Entities
The DIA and W3C Recognized Entities v1.0 address the same problem — letting a verifier establish that an issuer is recognised by an authority — and the W3C specification carries a UN GRID cross-border trade example describing the same three-tier chain UNTP implements. UNTP therefore expresses the DIA as a profile of that model rather than as a parallel design.
A DIA is typed as both DigitalIdentityAnchor and RecognizedEntityCredential, with its subject typed as both RegisteredIdentity and RecognizedEntity, so a conforming Recognized Entities processor consumes a DIA unchanged.
Those two W3C class terms need a note, because Recognized Entities has no vocabulary namespace or JSON-LD context of its own yet and its own examples borrow the VC examples context. UNTP declares them against their normative definitions in the specification itself, §3.2 and §3.4, rather than against a namespace W3C has not minted. Following either IRI lands on the definition, which is what a term IRI is for. They re-point to the W3C context when there is one. That is the only W3C dependency a DIA has, and it affects two type IRIs rather than any property: a DIA is a valid UNTP 1.0 credential whatever Recognized Entities does next.
What the profile adds
W3C defines the recognition relationship but not the register-managed identifier. A RecognizedEntity carries only the subject's DID, so there is no way to state the number the register actually holds — the company number, licence number or accreditation number a verifier looks up. W3C answers that with a container rather than with properties: registration is W3C-defined, and everything inside it is ecosystem vocabulary. UNTP therefore supplies the contents:
Property inside registration | Status in W3C Recognized Entities |
|---|---|
registeredId | Not defined. The number the register holds, unique within the register |
registeredName | Adjacent to the general legalName and name, but specifically the name of the registered thing |
controlType | Not defined. How the recognized entity holds the registration |
geoBoundary | Not defined. The geographic extent of the registered thing |
register | Not defined. The register that holds the registration, with its own URI and type |
registeredDate, registerType | Not defined |
recognitionScope | Not defined. What the registrar recognises about the entity, and under what mandate |
registration.id | The register's own record of the registration. Replaces the v0.8.0 publicInformation |
Two v0.8.0 properties are withdrawn rather than moved. registrar duplicated the credential issuer, which W3C's own definition of registration already ties the register to, and publicInformation is registration.id.
What the profile constrains
| W3C property | UNTP profile |
|---|---|
credentialSubject.id | SHOULD be a DID. Where it is a DID, the registrar MUST have proved control of it before issuing — see Proving control of the DID. Where it is an authoritative identifier URI for the entity, the DIA attests to the registration without anchoring any DID. W3C permits any URL and says nothing about proof |
credentialSubject | Exactly one RecognizedEntity. W3C permits a set; a DIA anchors one registration |
recognizedIn | Optional, and SHOULD be omitted where the entity is discoverable from its own DID through a service endpoint — see Recognition resting on an external trust list |
legalName, name, image, url, sameAs, description, digestMultibase | MAY be used, and the UNTP context defines each one so it expands to the same IRI a W3C processor expects — see General properties |
General properties
W3C lists nine general properties any entity object may carry: id, type, name, legalName, image, url, sameAs, description and digestMultibase. A DIA MAY use any of them, and the UNTP context defines each so that it expands to the IRI a W3C processor expects — schema:name, schema:legalName, schema:url and so on, which is where the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model points name and description itself. Without those definitions an implementer following this page would get an IRI minted under the UNTP namespace instead, which is interoperable with nothing.
Only name is required, because a credential that identifies its subject by DID alone is hard to read and harder to triage. The rest are permitted and not expected.
legalName in particular is left out of the profile. It is a formal claim most registrars are not the authority for: a land registry knows the name it holds on file, not the company's registered legal name, which belongs to the business register and to that register's own DIA. The same reasoning keeps a company number off the subject. Where a registrar wants to record that the entity appears elsewhere, the profile uses alsoKnownAs, which is a cross-reference and not an attestation. It expands to UNTP vocabulary rather than to one of the nine, so a Recognized Entities processor sees a property it does not know and ignores it, which is the correct outcome for an ecosystem extension. W3C's own sameAs was the alternative; alsoKnownAs keeps one spelling across UNTP, where Party already carries it, and matches the alsoKnownAs a DID document uses for the same job — see Adoption pathway for registrants without a DID.
Everything a register does assert sits in registration, where registeredName covers an organisation and a natural person alike.
A generic Recognized Entities processor therefore finds name on the subject and nothing more formal, which is the intended outcome. The recognition-validation algorithm reads neither, and a verifier matching a credential to a register reads registration.registeredId and recognitionScope.
Recognition resting on an external trust list
UNTP uses identifier-based discovery: resolve the DID, follow the service endpoint, fetch the DIA. That is the mode the W3C GRID example recommends for scale, and where it is available recognizedIn adds nothing — a second route to the same anchor is a second thing to keep in step, and a verifier given two answers has to decide which one wins.
The case it does serve is a recognition that rests on a trust framework outside the Verifiable Credentials ecosystem. A certification authority listed in an X.509 CA list, or a trust service provider on an ETSI trusted list, holds a recognition whose root of trust is the origin of that list URL rather than any credential. recognizedIn lets a DIA name that list, so a verifier already working from the PKI side can see the same entity from the UNTP side:
"recognizedIn": {
"id": "https://ec.europa.example/tsl/lotl.xml",
"type": "ExternalEntityList"
}
type here is the JSON-LD type of the referenced list rather than a code value, so it must be a term the context defines: ExternalEntityList for a list published outside the Verifiable Credentials ecosystem, or RecognizedEntityCredential for one that itself conforms to Recognized Entities. W3C states those two as a SHOULD over an open type space; UNTP restricts the value to the two it can interpret, because a third type is something a verifier could not act on. A verifier fetches the id to find out which list specification the resource complies with, and stops if it does not support it. The list is a bridge to another trust framework, so a DIA that uses it is saying the recognition is also recorded there, not that a verifier must go there instead.
Recognition scope
The v0.8.0 registrationScope property was described as "the roles or scopes of membership" but was used in practice for whatever the register recorded about an entity — a legal form, a licence category, a classification class. It is replaced by recognitionScope, an array in which each entry references a definition the registrar itself publishes:
"recognitionScope": [{
"type": ["RecognitionScope"],
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/entity-types/private-company-limited-by-shares",
"name": "Private Company Limited by Shares"
}]
idis the authoritative meaning. Authority stays with the register, and UNTP maintains no list of the world's legal forms, licence classes or accreditation categories.nameis the value as the register names it, in the register's own language — GmbH, Société à responsabilité limitée, Private Company Limited by Shares — so a verifier can display something meaningful without dereferencing. A scope entry is a reference and a label, and nothing else. It carries no code classifying the aspect it expresses and no reference to the controlled list the value is drawn from. Where a verifier needs that, the registrar declares it at the value URI withskos:inScheme, alongside theskos:broaderrelationship a verifier may already follow. The list is the registrar's to maintain, and a credential that cached it would have to be reissued whenever the registrar restructured it. A classifying code was dropped for the same reason it was never load-bearing: every check that uses recognition scope matches URIs, the name is self-describing for display, and a closed list of aspects has to grow each time a register expresses something nobody anticipated.
The geographic extent of a registration is not a scope. It is registration.geoBoundary, because under this model the registered thing is the parcel or the licence area itself — see Extent of a registration.
A single property works across register types because the question is the same in each — a business register records a legal form, a mining register a licence category and the area it covers, a trademark register a classification class, an accreditation body a class plus the standards it accredits against. registerType tells a verifier how to read them.
Delegation and non-amplification
Where a DIA is one link in a chain — the UN GRID recognises a national registrar, which anchors a company, which issues a product passport — a verifier checks that no link grants more than it was granted. The check is scoped to the question being asked: for the scope entry under test, every level of the chain must carry a matching or broader entry. Entries irrelevant to the question are not compared, which is why a company's legal form is never tested against what GRID granted its registrar.
Matching is by URI. Where an authority publishes a scope hierarchy, a verifier MAY dereference a scope URI and accept a declared skos:broader relationship to an entry held at the level above. Anything a verifier can neither match nor resolve fails closed.
Validation rules live outside the credential
A DIA records what the authority asserts and governs — the identity, the registered number, and the scope of the recognition. It deliberately does not carry rules for validating the credentials its subject goes on to issue.
Those rules belong in graph validation shapes, and UNTP already publishes them. AssessorAccreditedForScope checks that the issuer of a conformity credential holds a DIA whose recognitionScope covers the scheme or profile being attested; IssuerDiaSubjectMatch checks that an issuer DID is anchored at all. The rule is a query over the graph, maintained by the community that maintains the schemas it refers to.
The reason is lifecycle. A registrar refreshes an accreditation on its own cycle — annually, or on audit — and that cycle has nothing to do with how often a credential schema is versioned or a criterion URI is restructured. Embedding a schema reference in a DIA would mean reissuing registration credentials whenever a downstream artefact changed, which is not how any register works and not something a registrar could be asked to track. The DIA is the digital counterpart of the paper certificate the authority already issues, and it should carry what that certificate carries.
W3C Recognized Entities defines an optional outputValidation property for ecosystems that want in-credential constraints. The UNTP profile does not use it.
Implementation Guidance
Who Issues DIAs?
DIAs are issued by authorities that already operate authoritative identity registers — national business registers, mining cadastres, trademark offices, accreditation bodies, and similar institutions. These authorities have well-established registration and verification processes. The DIA simply extends their existing function by issuing a digitally verifiable credential that binds a member's DID to their registered identity, rather than only issuing paper or PDF registration certificates.
The issuer MUST be the legal entity with the authority to maintain the register (Issuer authority design requirement). That authority is statutory for a national register, delegated where a body acts under statutory appointment, and constitutional for an association that maintains a register of its own members. What the requirement excludes is a register as an administrative unit, which has no legal personality and so cannot answer for what it asserts, and a technology provider operating the register's infrastructure under contract.
The critical trust question for a verifier is: how do I know that the DIA issuer is genuinely the authority it claims to be, and not a fraudulent actor masquerading as an authoritative register?
Registers maintained by one registrar
One registrar commonly maintains several registers. A national registrars office may maintain the business register, the land register and the register of movable assets, and a single ministry may hold both a business register and a licensing register. Because the issuer is the registrar rather than the register, the issuer DID alone does not say which register a number came from, and a business registration number would otherwise be indistinguishable from a land title number.
registration.register carries that, and a verifier MUST NOT infer the register from the issuer (Register identified design requirement). A DIA for a company names the business register; a DIA for a land title names the land register. Where an entity holds registrations in two registers maintained by the same registrar, it is the subject of two DIAs.
A registrar's own mandate over each register it maintains is stated in the registrar's own DIA, as one recognitionScope entry per register, each entry's id being that register's own URI. A verifier that resolves the issuer DID can then confirm that the register cited by the DIA in hand is one the issuer is mandated to maintain. The entries are recommended rather than required, because a voluntary register has no mandate over a named register to state — see Non-Authoritative Registers.
Any credential issuer
The business, facility, and trademark samples on this page illustrate registerType. The same DIA anchors any issuer of a DPP, DCC, DFR, or DTE, including parties whose role is trade execution: an exporter, importer, carrier, freight forwarder, customs broker, certifier, regulator, or trade-finance institution.
The role is recorded in recognitionScope (Recognition scope design requirement). A customs-broker licence, a carrier authorisation, or an accreditation is a scope on a registration the party already holds. register.registerType is one of business, facility, product, trademark, land, asset, accreditation or membership.
A party may be the subject of several DIAs. Each register asserts only the identity it is competent to assert. A national business register may anchor the legal entity, and a separate licensing authority may anchor a broker authorisation. The registers stay independent. Statutory registers are listed in the UN GRID. Other schemes are listed in the UNTP implementation registers. UNTP does not publish a catalogue of which register covers which trade role, and it does not add a central identity authority to fill gaps between registers.
Where no register covers a role, the party may still issue credentials from its DID. Verification then confirms that the credential was signed by the controller of that DID. Confidence that the controller holds a registered identity starts when a register that knows the party issues a DIA. The verifier decides which DIAs it accepts.
A carrier's Digital Traceability Event and a customs broker's credential in the same shipment are checked the same way, using DIA Discovery: resolve the issuer DID, follow the dia service endpoint, verify the DIA, and confirm the DIA issuer is a recognised register. recognitionScope shows whether that registration covers the role the verifier needs. Names of registers in an implementation are illustrative. The directory of statutory registers is the UN GRID.
Authoritative Registers and the UN GRID
The UN/CEFACT Global Registrar Information Directory (GRID) is designed to address this trust question for authoritative registers operated by regulatory authorities in UN member states. Registers listed on the GRID — such as national business registers, land registries, and government-operated accreditation bodies — are maintained by recognised sovereign authorities. When a DIA issuer DID appears on the GRID, a verifier can have high confidence that the issuer is the legitimate authority for that identity scheme.
Register operators that wish to issue DIAs should:
- Register their identity scheme on the UN GRID, including their trusted issuer DID(s).
- Implement DID Auth or equivalent DID ownership verification before issuing DIAs to registered members.
- Make DIAs discoverable from both the member's DID document and the register's identity resolver service.
Non-Authoritative Registers
UNTP recognises that trust in the supply chain ecosystem is also supported by identity assertions from registers that are not operated by sovereign regulatory authorities. These include product registers (e.g. GS1 GTIN), industry association membership registers, facility registers operated by industry bodies, and similar non-governmental schemes. While these registers may not carry the same sovereign authority as government registers, they are nonetheless well-established and trusted within their respective domains.
The structure is the same one a statutory register uses, with register.registerType set to membership: the association is the legal entity that maintains its own register and answers for it, so it satisfies the issuer requirement without modification, and its authority comes from its constitution and its members rather than from a statute. A beekeepers' association issuing a DIA for a member states the membership number as registeredId, the membership register as register, and the membership class in recognitionScope.
What differs is the authority chain. A statutory register's authority is in law and discoverable through the GRID, so a verifier can establish that the register is the authoritative one for its purpose. A voluntary register has no equivalent, and the association's own DIA — issued by whichever registrar incorporated it — anchors its identity and its incorporation while saying nothing about its membership register. A DIA from a voluntary body therefore asserts that the subject is registered with that body, and whether that assertion carries weight is a question for the verifier, or for the scheme rules that name the body. The DIA carries the fact; recognition of the register's relevance sits outside it.
Because the UN GRID is designed to list only registers operated by regulatory authorities in member states, these non-authoritative registers are not eligible for GRID listing. Instead, UNTP maintains lists of recognised non-authoritative registers in its implementations register pages, providing a similar level of register identity assurance. Verifiers can consult both the UN GRID (for authoritative registers) and the UNTP register pages (for non-authoritative registers) to determine whether a DIA issuer is a recognised register operator.
Adoption pathway for registrants without a DID
A DIA SHOULD anchor a DID, and where it does, the Proof of DID control design requirement has no exception. For most registers, nearly all members arrive without a DID, so the specification admits two shapes a DIA can take. A register's choice between them is a step on an adoption pathway rather than a limitation of the credential, and matches the inclusive maturity model set out in the GRID governance framework.
With a DID (full anchor). credentialSubject.id is a DID that the registrar has proved control of. The DIA binds the registered identity to a key the member holds, so a verifier receiving a DPP, DFR or DCC signed under that DID can confirm the DID is controlled by the registered entity. This is the full semantic the credential is designed for, and the one the use cases on this page show.
Without a DID (registration attestation). credentialSubject.id is the register's own URI for the entity — the same URI a verifier would reach by resolving registeredId within the register. No DID-control proof applies. The credential is a register-signed statement that this entity exists with these attributes; it makes no key-binding claim and does not say who may sign on the entity's behalf. This is the shape a registrar at an earlier stage of the GRID maturity model issues for members who have not yet adopted DIDs. A member that adopts a DID later gets a new DIA with the DID as credentialSubject.id through the challenge-response exchange, issued alongside the earlier registration-attestation DIA rather than replacing it (Multiple DIDs).
Two routes are then open to a registrar whose members are adopting DIDs, and a register chooses which it supports:
- The register mints a DID at registration and transfers control on request. Where it does, that DID MUST use
did:webvh. Withdid:webthe DID document is whatever the domain owner serves, so a register that hosts the identifier keeps the ability to replace the member's keys and a verifier cannot tell that it has.did:webvhkeeps a signed, append-only history: after handover only the member's key authorises an update, an attempt to override it is visible in the log, and the identifier can be moved to a domain the member owns without changing. Those properties are what make the handover real rather than nominal. - The member brings its own DID.
did:webvhSHOULD be used, for the same auditability reasons, but any supported DID method is acceptable. A member that already operates adid:webon its own domain should not have to replace it in order to register.
A register MUST NOT create a DID for a member who has not asked it to, which is the general rule for claimed and unclaimed identifiers, applied by the Digital Facility Record to facility identifiers. A register may hold as many identifiers as it likes and publish directory information about them; what it must not do is speak for a member that has not asked it to. Nor should a register hold signing keys for its members as a matter of course: a register that both attests to registrations and signs on behalf of its members is a single breach away from being able to forge both.
Where a member has no capability to operate a DID at all, custody belongs with its software provider rather than with its register — see identifier control and key custody, which separates control of the identifier from custody of the signing key and sets out the arrangements in between. A compromised provider cannot forge registrations, and a compromised register cannot forge signatures; putting both in one place removes that separation. A member does not need to understand DIDs, but someone acting for it does.
Proving control of the DID
This section applies to a DIA whose credentialSubject.id is a DID. A DIA whose subject is the register's own authoritative URI for the entity makes no key-binding claim, so no DID-control proof applies — see Adoption pathway for registrants without a DID.
Where a DIA names a DID, it asserts that the registered identity and the DID belong to the same party. That assertion is only worth anything if the registrar established, before issuing, that the party in front of it actually controls the DID. Otherwise anyone could present a well-known DID — a competitor's, or a large brand's — and have it anchored to their own registration, which is the single most damaging failure available against this credential.
The Proof of DID control design requirement therefore requires a challenge-response exchange, not a declaration. Asking an applicant to type a DID into a form, or to upload a document naming one, does not establish control. Neither does resolving the DID and finding a plausible organisation name in the DID document.
What the exchange must establish
Before issuing a DIA, the registrar MUST:
- Generate a fresh, unpredictable challenge — a nonce with sufficient entropy, bound to this issuance and used once. It MUST have a short expiry, and the registrar MUST reject a response to an expired or already-used challenge.
- Require the applicant to return a proof over that challenge, signed by a key that the DID document names for authentication.
- Resolve the DID itself, from the DID's own method, at verification time. The registrar MUST NOT rely on a DID document supplied by the applicant.
- Verify the signature against a verification method listed under
authenticationin the resolved DID document. A key that appears only under other verification relationships, such askeyAgreement, MUST NOT be accepted. - Confirm the DID in the proof is the DID being anchored — byte-for-byte the value that will appear in
credentialSubject.id. - Retain evidence of the exchange, so the registrar can demonstrate the basis on which it issued. Retention SHOULD extend for the life of the DIA. Where a registrar's own regulatory framework caps how long it may hold such records, that framework governs, and the registrar SHOULD record that the exchange took place and when, even once the evidence itself has been disposed of.
DID Auth is the RECOMMENDED protocol. A W3C Verifiable Presentation containing the challenge and signed by the applicant's DID satisfies the requirement equally, and reuses machinery a UNTP implementer already has.
When it must be repeated
Proof of control is a point-in-time fact, so:
- A new DID for an existing registration needs its own exchange. The Multiple DIDs design requirement allows a registered identity to have several DIDs, and each is separately proved and separately anchored.
- A change of key within the same DID does not require re-proof; that is what the DID document is for. A change of DID controller does, because control is precisely what was established.
- Registrars SHOULD re-verify periodically for long-lived anchors. How often is the registrar's call, and is best tied to a cycle it already runs — on renewal of the underlying registration, or at audit — rather than a separate schedule. Where a registrar has no such cycle, annual re-verification is a reasonable default. What matters is that the interval is published, so a verifier can reason about how stale a binding might be.
Superseding an anchor is not revoking it
A member's DID changes more often than its registration does — most commonly when the member moves between software providers, since a DID hosted on a provider's domain does not travel with the customer. Each DIA is bounded by validFrom and validUntil, which makes it a statement about a period rather than about the present, and a verifier checking a credential signed two years ago needs the binding that was current then.
- A registrar MUST NOT overwrite, withdraw or revoke an anchor merely because the member's DID has changed. It issues an additional anchor for the new DID (Multiple DIDs) and leaves the superseded one in place, bounded by its validity dates, so that credentials signed under the previous DID remain verifiable.
- Revocation via
credentialStatusis for a different situation: the binding was never true, was obtained fraudulently, or the underlying registration itself has ended. It says this assertion should never have been relied on, which is not what a change of software provider means. - A registrar that treats an anchor as a record of current state, and updates it in place, silently breaks every credential its member ever issued. The signature still verifies; nothing any longer connects the signing DID to the registered entity, which is the whole purpose of the anchor.
A registrar that issues a DIA without this exchange undermines every credential downstream of it, because the whole chain rests on the binding the DIA asserts.
The Components of a DIA
This section provides sample JSON-LD snippets for each DIA component, drawn from the smelter identity anchor sample.
Credential Envelope
All DIAs are issued as W3C Verifiable Credentials (VCDM 2.0). The credential type includes both VerifiableCredential and DigitalIdentityAnchor, and the @context references both the W3C VCDM and UNTP context URIs. Critically, the issuer MUST be the authoritative register itself — not the entity whose identity is being anchored. The issuer id SHOULD be a DID using a supported DID method, and the domain MUST match the well-known domain of the issuing authority so that verifiers can confirm registry identity via public records. Please refer to DPP VC Guidance for further information about the use of the verifiable credentials data model for UNTP.
{
"type": ["DigitalIdentityAnchor", "VerifiableCredential"],
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://vocabulary.uncefact.org/untp/0.8.0/context/"
],
"id": "https://credentials.sample-business-register.example.com/dia/BR-00042187",
"issuer": {
"type": ["CredentialIssuer"],
"id": "did:web:sample-business-register.example.com",
"name": "Sample Business Register",
"issuerAlsoKnownAs": [
{
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com",
"name": "Sample Business Register"
}
]
},
"validFrom": "2025-04-01T00:00:00Z",
"validUntil": "2027-03-31T00:00:00Z",
"name": "Business registration — Sample Copper Refinery Ltd",
"credentialSubject": {
"type": ["RecognizedEntity"],
"...": "..."
}
}
Recognized Entity and its Registration
The credentialSubject of the DIA is a W3C RecognizedEntity. It establishes the binding between a DID controlled by the subject and a registration held in a register maintained by the issuer.
On the subject itself:
idSHOULD be the DID of the registered member. Where it is a DID, the registrar MUST have proved that the member controls it before issuing — see Proving control of the DID. Where it is the register's own authoritative URI for the entity, the DIA attests to the registration without anchoring any DID — see Adoption pathway for registrants without a DID.nameis the name of the controller as the registrar holds it, covering an organisation and a natural person alike.alsoKnownAsMAY carry one reference to the same entity in another system, such as a land registry's cross-reference to the titleholder's entry in a business register. It is a pointer rather than an assertion: the issuer states where else the entity appears and claims nothing about the standing it holds there, which is all a registrar can honestly say about a record another register maintains. Anything the issuer does attest to is aregistration. It is the same property asParty.alsoKnownAsin the core vocabulary, carried here as a single optional object rather than an array, since one cross-reference is what a registrar can reasonably hold.registrationis the list of registrations the registrar attests this entity controls. One or more, each typedRegisteredIdentity.
Inside registration:
idis the register's own record of this registration, as a resolvable URI.registeredIdis the identifier value that is unique within the register (but may not be globally unique), for example a corporate number, facility licence number, trademark registration number or membership number.registeredNameis the name or designation of the registered thing — a vessel name, a trademark text, a parcel designation. Omitted where the registration is of the entity itself and would merely repeat the subject'sname.registeredDateis the date the entity was first registered.registeridentifies the register that holds this registration: a resolvableid, thenamethe registrar publishes, and theregisterType. Where the register is listed on the UN GRID,register.idSHOULD be the URI GRID holds for it, so that the directory entry and the credential can be matched rather than name-compared. If the register is registered with UN/CEFACT thenregister.idMUST match theidentityRegister.idin the UN/CEFACT scheme register.register.registerTypeclassifies the register, from the UN/CEFACT registry-type code list:business,facility,product,trademark,land,asset,accreditationormembership.assetcovers registers of movable assets such as vessels, aircraft and rolling stock. It describes the register rather than the registration, which is why it sits here.controlTypestates how the entity holds the registration, from the UN/CEFACT control-type code list:selfwhere the registration is of the entity itself, otherwiseowner,lessee,licensee,operator,memberoragent.geoBoundaryis the geographic extent of the registered thing, where it has one. See Extent of a registration.recognitionScopestates the scope of the recognition — what the registrar recognises about this registration and under what mandate. See Recognition scope.
Extent of a registration
A land title covers a parcel; a mining licence is granted over an area. That geometry belongs to the registration, since the registration is the parcel or the licence, and it is carried as geoBoundary: an ordered closed polygon of latitude and longitude points, in the same form a facility location uses. In v0.8.0 it sat on a territory recognition scope, which was the right place while the subject was assumed to be the registered thing and the wrong one once the subject became its controller.
It bounds what is registered, not where the controller is. A company's registered office is an address; the parcel its title covers is a boundary. A facility publishing its own geoBoundary can point locationInformation.geolocationEvidence at a land DIA, and the facility's boundary must fall inside the parcel the title covers — a mismatch a verifier can detect, and cannot without the geometry.
A territory recognition scope remains available for the different case of a recognition limited to a territory, such as a customs-broker licence valid in one state, where no registered thing has an extent of its own.
Worked examples for each register type are shown in the use case sections below.
Use Case: Business Register
A national business register issues a DIA to anchor a company's DID to its registered corporate identity. This is the most common DIA use case — it allows a verifier who receives a DPP, DFR, or DCC issued by the company to confirm that the issuer DID is controlled by a legitimately registered business entity. In this example, a national business register anchors the copper refinery's DID to its registration number.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-refinery.example.com",
"name": "Sample Copper Refinery Ltd",
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/registers/business/entities/BR-00042187",
"registeredId": "BR-00042187",
"registeredDate": "1985-06-15",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/registers/business",
"name": "Sample Business Register",
"registerType": "business"
},
"controlType": "self",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/entity-types/public-company-limited-by-shares",
"name": "Public Company Limited by Shares"
}
]
}
]
}
Use Case: Facility Register
A national mining cadastre or environmental register issues a DIA to anchor a facility operator's DID to a registered mine site or production facility. This allows verifiers to confirm that the operator of a facility — as identified by their DID in a Digital Facility Record — is the legitimate holder of the facility licence. In this example, the Sample Mining Cadastre anchors the mine operator's DID to its large-scale mining licence. The operator is a company the cadastre did not incorporate, so its entry in the business register is cited as alsoKnownAs rather than asserted: the cadastre says where the operator appears and leaves that register to attest to it.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-mine.example.com",
"name": "Sample Mine Operator Ltd",
"alsoKnownAs": {
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/registers/business/entities/BR-00071234",
"name": "Sample Mine Operator Ltd"
},
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-mining-cadastre.example.com/registers/mining-licence/licences/ML-0012",
"registeredId": "ML-0012",
"registeredName": "Sample Copper Mine",
"registeredDate": "2003-09-22",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-mining-cadastre.example.com/registers/mining-licence",
"name": "Sample Mining Licence Register",
"registerType": "facility"
},
"controlType": "operator",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-mining-cadastre.example.com/licence-types/large-scale-mining",
"name": "Large-Scale Mining Licence"
}
],
"geoBoundary": [
{
"latitude": -12.15,
"longitude": 26.35
},
{
"latitude": -12.15,
"longitude": 26.41
},
{
"latitude": -12.2,
"longitude": 26.41
},
{
"latitude": -12.2,
"longitude": 26.35
},
{
"latitude": -12.15,
"longitude": 26.35
}
]
}
]
}
Use Case: Trademark Register
A national intellectual property office issues a DIA to anchor a trademark owner's DID to a registered trademark. This allows verifiers to confirm that the entity using a brand name on product passports is the legitimate owner of that trademark. In this example, an intellectual property office anchors the battery manufacturer's DID to a registered trademark in goods class 9, which covers electrical apparatus. The subject is the proprietor and the registration is the mark, held as owner, so the mark's text is registration.registeredName while the company's own name stays on the subject.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-battery.example.com",
"name": "Sample Battery Manufacturer Ltd",
"alsoKnownAs": {
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/registers/business/entities/BR-00088214",
"name": "Sample Battery Manufacturer Ltd"
},
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-ip-office.example.com/registers/trademark/marks/TM-0024001234",
"registeredId": "TM-0024001234",
"registeredName": "SampleCell",
"registeredDate": "2022-03-10",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-ip-office.example.com/registers/trademark",
"name": "Sample Trademark Register",
"registerType": "trademark"
},
"controlType": "owner",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-ip-office.example.com/goods-classes/9",
"name": "Goods Class 9 \u2014 electrical apparatus"
}
]
}
]
}
Use Case: Land Register
A land authority issues a DIA to anchor a titleholder's DID to a registered right over an identified parcel. The subject is the titleholder and the registration is the parcel, held as lessee under a mining lease, with the parcel boundary carried as registration.geoBoundary. As in the facility case, the titleholder's company record is a cross-reference rather than a claim the lands registry is making. That is what lets a verifier check a claimed location against the title rather than take it on trust: a facility publishing a geoBoundary can point locationInformation.geolocationEvidence at this credential, and the facility's boundary must fall inside the parcel the title covers. A boundary that does not is a mismatch a verifier can detect; without the geometry it cannot.
In this example a national land register anchors the mine operator's DID to a mining lease over an identified parcel.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-mine.example.com",
"name": "Sample Mine Operator Ltd",
"alsoKnownAs": {
"id": "https://sample-business-register.example.com/registers/business/entities/BR-00071234",
"name": "Sample Mine Operator Ltd"
},
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-lands-registry.example.com/registers/land/titles/LT-04187",
"registeredId": "LT-04187",
"registeredName": "Sample Parcel 04187",
"registeredDate": "2019-11-04",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-lands-registry.example.com/registers/land",
"name": "Sample Land Register",
"registerType": "land"
},
"controlType": "lessee",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-lands-registry.example.com/tenure-types/mining-lease",
"name": "Mining Lease"
}
],
"geoBoundary": [
{
"latitude": -12.15,
"longitude": 26.35
},
{
"latitude": -12.15,
"longitude": 26.42
},
{
"latitude": -12.09,
"longitude": 26.42
},
{
"latitude": -12.09,
"longitude": 26.35
},
{
"latitude": -12.15,
"longitude": 26.35
}
]
}
]
}
A title is a right over land, so the entity being recognised is the titleholder and the parcel is the scope of that recognition. The two scope entries say different things and a verifier should not conflate them: the first is what kind of tenure is held, the second is where it is held.
Use Case: A Registrar Maintaining Several Registers
A registrar that maintains more than one register issues every DIA from one DID, because the registrar is the legal entity with the authority and an individual register is not. The register is identified by registration.register, never inferred from the issuer. Here a national registrars office, which maintains the business, land and movable assets registers, issues a land title registration.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-company.example.com",
"name": "Sample Company Pty Ltd",
"alsoKnownAs": {
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/registers/business/entities/BR-87654321",
"name": "Sample Company Pty Ltd"
},
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/registers/land/titles/LT-41872",
"registeredId": "LT-41872",
"registeredName": "Sample Parcel 41872",
"registeredDate": "2021-11-08",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/registers/land",
"name": "Sample Land Register",
"registerType": "land"
},
"controlType": "owner",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/tenure-types/freehold",
"name": "Freehold Title"
}
],
"geoBoundary": [
{
"latitude": 40.4168,
"longitude": -3.7038
},
{
"latitude": 40.4172,
"longitude": -3.7031
},
{
"latitude": 40.4166,
"longitude": -3.7024
},
{
"latitude": 40.4168,
"longitude": -3.7038
}
]
}
]
}
The registrar's mandate over each register it maintains is stated in its own DIA, issued in this example by a ministry of justice. Each scope entry names one register, with the entry id matching the register.id that DIAs from that register will cite, so a verifier can confirm the two line up by URI.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-registrars-office.example.org",
"name": "Sample Registrars Office",
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-ministry.example.org/registers/statutory-bodies/bodies/SB-0001",
"registeredId": "SB-0001",
"registeredDate": "1934-02-08",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-ministry.example.org/registers/statutory-bodies",
"name": "Sample Register of Statutory Bodies",
"registerType": "business"
},
"controlType": "self",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/registers/business",
"name": "Sample Business Register"
},
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/registers/land",
"name": "Sample Land Register"
},
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-registrars-office.example.org/registers/movable-assets",
"name": "Sample Movable Assets Register"
}
]
}
]
}
Use Case: Voluntary Membership Register
A register need not be statutory. An industry association maintains a register of its members and can anchor a member's DID to that membership, with registerType set to membership. The subject here is a natural person, which the model handles without a special case: the subject carries name, and registration.registeredName is omitted because the registration is of the member themselves. The association cites the national apiary register as alsoKnownAs, which is the same person in another register and not something the association is in a position to attest. The association's authority to maintain the register comes from its constitution, and what the membership is worth to a verifier is a matter for the verifier or for the scheme rules that name the association — see Non-Authoritative Registers.
"credentialSubject": {
"type": [
"RecognizedEntity"
],
"id": "did:web:sample-beekeeper.example.com",
"name": "Sample Beekeeper",
"alsoKnownAs": {
"id": "https://sample-apiary-register.example.org/beekeepers/BK-20417",
"name": "Sample Beekeeper"
},
"registration": [
{
"type": [
"RegisteredIdentity"
],
"id": "https://sample-beekeepers.example.org/registers/membership/members/MB-4471",
"registeredId": "MB-4471",
"registeredDate": "2017-09-01",
"register": {
"type": [
"Register"
],
"id": "https://sample-beekeepers.example.org/registers/membership",
"name": "Sample Beekeepers Membership Register",
"registerType": "membership"
},
"controlType": "self",
"recognitionScope": [
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-beekeepers.example.org/classes/certified-producer",
"name": "Certified Producer"
},
{
"type": [
"RecognitionScope"
],
"id": "https://sample-beekeepers.example.org/standards/apiary-practice/v2",
"name": "Sample Apiary Practice Standard v2"
}
]
}
]
}
DIA Discovery
DIA credentials SHOULD be discoverable from either identifier:
- Given a DID (eg as the issuer of a DPP) via DID document
serviceendpoint. - Given a registered identifier (eg a VAT registration number) via the ID scheme resolver service.
Via DID Service Endpoint
As described in the W3C Decentralized Identifiers specification, DIDs are resolvable to a DID document. The service property of a DID document contains an array of typed serviceEndpoint which can point to services or credentials relevant to the DID. A DID document may also contain an "alsoKownAs" property which is typically used to reference other identifiers. Controllers of DIDs that are linked to authoritative register SHOULD
- Include the URI of registered identifier in the
alsoKnownAsproperty of the DID document to establish a bidirectional link. In the snippet belowhttps://sample-register.gov/90664869327has been added. - Add proof that the relationship is reciprocal by adding a
serviceobject that references the DIA credential. In the example below, the DIA credential URL ishttps://sample-credential-store.com/credentials/dia-90664869327.json
{
"id": "did:method:sample-business.com:123456789",
"authentication": [{..}],
..
"alsoKnownAs": ["https://sample-register.gov/90664869327"],
"service": [{
"id":"did:method:sample-business.com:123456789#90664869327",
"type":"https://test.uncefact.org/vocabulary/link-type/dia",
"serviceEndpoint": {
"href":"https://sample-credential-store.com/credentials/dia-90664869327.json",
"title":"Digital Identity Anchor",
"type": "application/vc+jwt"
}
}]
}
Via Identity Resolver
As described in the UNTP Identity Resolver specification, existing identity registers are encouraged to make their registered identities resolvable and verifiable.
- Identifiers are made resolvable by implementing ISO-18975 to encode IDs as URLs and returning an IETF rfc-9264 link-set with links to relevant further data about the ID.
- Identifiers are made verifiable by issuing DIAs per this specification.
This presents the opportunity to make the DIA discoverable by returning an appropriate link in the link-set. For example, given a VAT registration number 90664869327 issued under scheme https://sample-register.gov and applying the scheme resolver template may yield a resolver service URL of https://resolver.sample-register.gov/vatNumber/90664869327
The resolver service may be called with parameters that define which link-types to return. https://resolver.sample-register.gov/vatNumber/90664869327?linkType=linkset will return a linkset that SHOULD contain the DIA credential link (among other links such as the registration history) as follows.
{
"linkset": [
{
"anchor": "https://resolver.sample-register.gov/vatNumber/90664869327",
"https://test.uncefact.org/vocabulary/link-type/dia": [
{
"href": "https://sample-credential-store.com/credentials/dia-90664869327.json",
"title": "Digital Identity Anchor",
"type": "application/vc+jwt"
}
]
},
{
"anchor": "https://resolver.sample-register.gov/vatNumber/90664869327",
"about": [
{
"href": "https://sample-register.gov/registrationHistory?id=90664869327",
"title": "Registration History",
"type": "text/html"
}
]
}
]
}
Alternatively, invoking the resolver service with the canonical DIA link relation URI as the percent-encoded linkType value would redirect directly to the matching link:
https://resolver.sample-register.gov/vatNumber/90664869327?linkType=https%3A%2F%2Ftest.uncefact.org%2Fvocabulary%2Flink-type%2Fdia
https://sample-credential-store.com/credentials/dia-90664869327.json