

Transcript

November 5, 2025, 8:31AM



Brett Hyland 3:13

With intros done, let's move to the agenda. The first item is the review of the GitLab page for the scheme vocabulary. Now we've working on this for quite a while now. So it would be really lovely if we close this out tonight and say that we've achieved something. The latest version circulated is not that much different from the previous version, except that I've removed the conformity topics list - we know there are things wrong with that list and it is incomplete but that will be an ongoing project so I don't think that we want to be distracted from the task at hand which is defining the scheme vocabulary structure. I haven't had much feedback since I circulated it, so I'm hoping that people might be reasonably comfortable with it by now. So any thoughts on the scheme vocab webpage version 5?



AW Andrew Wheeler 5:08

Whatever you do, Brett, there'll be something wrong with it and you've got to start somewhere.



Brett Hyland 5:13

Yeah, well, that's an excellent point, Andrew. We can always revise it again. Unless someone else wants to make a comment, I'll suggest that we accept this for posting onto the UNTP spec page. If new issues are found with it then we can address those as they arise. Zach will be the one, I guess, that will implement that effect so, Zach, any problems that you foresee there? I got a thumbs up there, good, thank you very much.



GR Gideon Richards 6:14

I think it's probably covered, but I think we'll come back to this a few times on the way through as we develop and grow the other parts of the documents anyway.



Brett Hyland 6:15

Yep thanks, Gideon. So we're going continue a conversation that we've been having over the past two meetings, which is about scheme credibility and you know that defining this isn't a straightforward issue. Now I've got a few slides that I'd like to show which I hope might provide a bit of context for the discussion.

The question that we've been asking for a couple of meetings now is do we expect objectively credible substantiation of claims in UNTP? I can note that the UNECE recommendation 49 contains 50 instances of the word 'trust' or related words, so it clearly is an important theme in Recommendation 49. Of course we do say that UNTP is the UN's implementation of Recommendation 49. But in terms of trust, we might identify two different aspects. One is whether our role is to ensure that the basis for either trusting a UNTP credential, or not trusting a UNTP credential, is made clear. So that that's one way of coming at this, which is to say that the UNTP credential might be worthless but as long as it's clear why you shouldn't trust it, then that's OK.

The other way to come at the problem is ask whether UNTP conformities should be trustworthy in general. That is, if someone's issuing a UNTP conformity credential then it should be trustworthy, full stop.

We might drill into some of the statements within Recommendation 49 to try and understand what the intent is - I'm quoting some here on the slide to try. We see it talks about delivering trust in sustainability information. It talks about recognized authorities, trustworthy actors, it talks about increasing the market value of products through credible sustainability credentials. I mean, it's presenting an expectation that the UNTP credentials should be trustworthy, credible. Here are some more quotes, it talk about parties conducting assessments should have should hold appropriate authorisation and accreditation. Let's not worry about the exact technical words, but there's probably a fairly clear intent there as well. And even where there's no conformity assessment at all, there's the idea that high integrity primary evidence can be important, which is all part of this same flavour of credibility and trustworthiness as the default, not an optional extra.

Ok the next slide considers the UNTP spec and the relevant logical models. I'm not sure how many of you would know, but the conformity credential logical model actually includes three code lists that that I would describe as being trust-related. So one is the attestation type, conformity experts might refer to that as the functional approach. Then there's the assessor level which is just a simple list, first party, second party buyer, second party contractor, third party body. The third code list is the assessment level, which allows selection of accreditation for example, or the multilateral recognition arrangement.

Then, perhaps most importantly of all, there's provision in the conformity credential to link to an external CAB endorsement credential, meaning some party has issued

some kind of endorsement for the conformity assessment body. So, I think we're probably looking pretty good, so far as the logical model for the conformity credential is concerned. However, you would be also aware of course that the conformity credential links to the scheme under which the credential is issued - if there is a scheme, which won't always be case. As matters stand today, I don't believe there is provision for any trust related code list for the scheme or any provision for linking from the scheme to a scheme endorsement, like an independent scheme benchmarking recognition. So, if we're talking about transparency, it seems to me that is a gap here. Anyway, we've been aware of that for some time and in fact it is already one of our outstanding actions to address, we are on to it.

The next slide introduces another piece of context, which is we believe we are setting our sights beyond EU DPPs yet sustainability discussions are still often occurring in the context of EU DPPs, which is perhaps a bit odd because in this context the integrity of product claims is regulated anyway. So that's probably the context that we're least worried about. What is more interesting is where there's no legislative enforcement so, if people are lying about claims we need UNTP to be able to provide transparency. Which is where the credible substantiation comes in. Anyway, if we move past EU DPPs into the wider trade context, we encounter a fairly complex environment. Yet I think it's also fair to say that global norms do exist and that these can be reflected in legally binding intergovernmental arrangements, free trade agreements for example, and the WTO technical barriers to trade agreement, which I'm sure probably every country that we represent here today would be signatories to.

And the point here is, that that conformity assessment of sustainability claims doesn't occur inside a bubble, it occurs in the midst of a fairly well-established space. In fact over a million people are engaged in the TIC sector worldwide (TIC is testing inspection certification). So I think it's legitimate to ask, how may UNTP retain a measure of credibility within this wider trade context?

Then there's another issue, one that has really been the basis of my own change of heart over recent weeks, which is the matter of parties potentially appropriating the UN's credibility. So, what are we to make of parties that describe themselves as UNTP compliant or UNTP registered as you'll on LinkedIn. Or you know, that they're issuing UNTP credentials, following UNTP protocols. It all sounds very impressive, but if these parties were issuing credentials for which the linked data gives no objective reason to judge that credential as trustworthy, how can that align with the intent of

Recommendation 49 for delivering trustworthy product information? I suspect it doesn't.

It would seem a nice idea if unrelated parties could observe and say "no, you aren't UNTP compliant because here's your credential and it doesn't meet the defined minimum data set for credibility". I think that would be a nice place to be.

My final slide is how I personally see our UNTP conformity challenge. You all may see it quite differently, but I see our challenge as whether we can prepare a technical recommendation for the issuance of objectively credible conformity credentials which respects the intent of REC 49 and which can be understood in relation to existing trade norms and can be encoded such that a non-credible credential would trigger a fail in the default UN test harness. You see I've made a little note there that a failing credential could still be freely shared or referenced, but any claim about that credential being UNTP-compliant would therefore be demonstrably wrong.

That's how I see our challenge. So. for the rest of the meeting, we'll open this matter up for discussion.

NS

Neil Savery 17:42

Yeah, you're opening the sore wound, Brett, which I know you would be aware of, but I'm glad you've done it. So going back over the conversation we've had over the past two meetings, the first thing I'd like to say is on your first slide you had that proposition of two questions. And I think from certainly from my perspective, it's the second of the two that they have to be trustworthy credentials. What? I can't remember your exact language? Trustworthy in general, that's it I mean otherwise, I think the exercise is going to fail. If the UNTP process cannot be trusted, if the credentials that come out of this process cannot be trusted by governments, consumers, et cetera, then I can't understand what the point of the exercise is. So that that's the first point I'd like to make. But getting to there, that that's kind of all your subsequent slides and I know this is an oversimplification and it goes back to the conversation that I think Gideon you and Phil were certainly involved in the last meeting, also Rinaldo has expressed views as well, that we cannot through the UNTP instruct, regulate, mandate, etc. I would like to think that through the protocol process, which goes to your last slide in terms of a recommendation, we can somehow direct traffic in a way that tries to regularise this exercise towards what we are familiar with in the normal tech environment. For example building product characteristics not related to sustainability, where sustainability seems to be running

this parallel process without being subjected to the tried and tested arrangements of the 17000 series of requirements for testing, inspection and certification. For instance, if governments at some point, be it the EU or Australia or in America, require that products that coming into their market with environmental credential claims, our expectation under our regulations is that the bodies assessing and providing those credentials must have some form of independent accreditation as to their capabilities, their competencies, et cetera, because that's the means by which we can all trust. We have to ask what is actually coming out through this UNTP process. So I'm taking a fairly simplistic view that it would be nice if we could just slot UNTP across into the conventional practice that we're all familiar with for other product characteristics which are subject to CASCO Toolbox arrangements. But it seems we're not doing that in part because, as I understand from your comments, Brett, the UN and the UNTP can't enforce or mandate that. But can we reference that framework, can we at least point in that direction through the recommendation that you're suggesting in your last slide?



Brett Hyland 22:02

Well, that's what we're here to discuss. For those that don't know Neil, he is a former regulator, in fact, he was THE Australian regulator for building products in Australia. And so Neil is very familiar with the CASCO toolbox, which is the basis for building product conformity in Australia. But I won't editorialise on Neil's comments. Gideon is next and then Martin.



Gideon Richards 22:30

Yeah, I thanks for that. I think this is a really fundamental point for me. If it's not going to have credibility, if it's not going to be trustworthy, then what's the reputational damage for those who are engaged with it?

I was talking in a meeting yesterday at a regional level in the UK and we were talking about a scheme they are developing. We were talking about insulation, we've had a lot of problems in the UK with insulation that is supposedly certified and approved to all the standards and yet it's been going wrong. And my comment to them was if, you go down this route, you have to make sure that it's credible. You have to make sure that what you're providing assurance to the consumer, because the consumer doesn't know what they're relying on, they just have this QR code that gives information and links to other organisations that they're going to believe are

credible. And I think that's the important part of it for me. I'm seeing ISEAL on the call, there's a huge amount of brand credibility there, that when people look at something with ISEAL attached to it. They have done it effectively and I think it's right that we should be looking at that, even if we can't point directly to all of the standards in in CASCO Toolbox. We can write things in a way that gives the expectation of we're doing, that for me is the really important part of this. If we don't do that then I'm not sure why we're doing it at all, or why would others take it up and promote it.

MC **Martyn Cole** 24:47

I'm new to this conversation, so forgive me if these comments are somewhat naive. But just thinking about the conversation of trustworthiness, to my mind, it's a combination of what's being said and how effectively you can measure the truth of what's being said.

You know, that's where the trustworthiness element comes in. I think if you look at it at a scale, if you go with the option of having no credentials by which to understand trustworthiness, you know that the process doesn't have trustworthiness. You have no defence against people asking how do we trust what you've developed? But if you have some credentials, at least you have some defence, you can learn something as to what those credentials are. But then you have a question as to what's the level of effort you would like to put into developing those credentials. Do you want to seek uniform consensus on what those credentials could look like? In either event, you're only going to go so far. So, you know, establishing some form of credentials as a starting point I think is valuable. And then you know to the point of accreditation or whatever, you know there's the mechanism through which you assess those credentials. So it is a combination of a number of different factors, but my perspective is you could wrap yourself up in conversations about why people should trust you, as opposed to wrapping yourself up in conversations as to how to improve the process. And I think the starting point may be credentials and then what you're listening to are comments on how you can improve that, as opposed to why should we trust this?

Z **Zach (Pyx)** 26:32

First, I want to say Brett, thank you for putting that summary together and walking us through the basis for solving this problem. That was a really helpful exercise from my

perspective. There's a couple of things that are showing up for me in this discussion and one is adoption, so I'm the technical lead on this group but also the technical lead on the adoption group and so if we make the entrance criteria too high then we won't get adopted. And we'll get we'll be at the same point where we'll be asking ourselves what's the point? But I think credibility and trustworthiness here is critical, so we need to be able to find the balance and figure out a way to do both. And I very much liked some sort of verifiably demonstrated, this does or not meet the minimum requirements of a UNTP credential and the deterministic outcome, passes or does not pass. I think that's a really powerful outcome. And so there's kind of two things that emerge for me on that and one is kind of a credibility pathway, where schemes that may be less mature but still have relevance where adopters have a pathway to increasing credibility, to get closer and closer to an CASCO toolbox style conformity credential. So basically a maturity model style thing, now that adds complexity, so I'm not proposing that at this point, but it feels like we need to have relatively straightforward adoption pathways as well as relatively straightforward ways to evaluate against level of credibility that gets built into the scheme definitions. The second thing that emerges for me is one of the things that is true about the UNTP linked data model which is a little different to normal conformity processes is that there's actually a lot richer sets of information potentially available to an evaluator as they're looking at these credentials and that we describe that in various places as trust graphs and those additional data elements can do a lot to increase the trustworthiness of the overall claims that are being made because there's lots of pieces of additional information that may also be available when you're evaluating the credential. And that sort of emergent property of the linked data is something that I think is potentially beyond the scope of this discussion as we're having it now, but maybe something we want to explore as we're thinking about sort of credibility assessments and trustworthiness and so I just want to put that out there as a discussion point for as we go forward.

AW **Andrew Wheeler** 30:53

Yeah, again, I I can be coming at from a simplistic point of view as a as a product certifier. But what trust do we have in the paper system now? You know I think you know you can get a piece of paper that there's no trust to it. It's making sure we can actually verify something I think what we do need a benchmark or something of a certain minimum amount of information that is provided within the UNTP. But again,

the level of trust I think needs to be established through the various credentials and I don't think it's up to the UNTP to establish the trust, because the trust is actually derived, it's going to vary depending on different products and different ways of going about it.



Brett Hyland 31:54

Yes, that so for those that don't know, Andrew manages a product certification scheme which is accredited here in Australia by the national body under the ISO CASCO standard 17065. But not every scheme has those types of qualifications.



Figueiredo, Reinaldo 32:51

I'm hearing all of you guys here and I agree as well in terms of what is the path that we're going to have in this document. We know there exist different mechanisms to achieve credibility, trust. I mean it can be through governments, can be completely independent organizations that get together and use international principles in peer evaluation and then we have the mechanism of IAF. We all know that work in this area that the standards and scheme is a problem that affects credibility, how to develop the standards, how to develop the scheme. This is all about credibility because if the organizations that are taking the lead don't follow international principles then, at the end, the consumer is not going to have trust in the chain of conformity assessment because the consumer does not know anything. I mean I just want my cell phone to work. So here is the same thing with sustainability, when we we're going to see a product or a process with some statement and we just trust that there is some kind of a process behind that to demonstrate evidence. I also think with AI, it's going to be worse because here in the US in food safety, you can't imagine what's start to happen here with AI generated evidence. So it's a big challenge but I think we need to have a baseline. Yet I agree with Zach as well, that our principals cannot close the door and say, look, this is what you need to have and if you don't have then you're not in the game. I think we need to have an alternative pathway or some steps for those organization to achieve this.



Gideon Richards 35:53

Yeah, thanks. A couple of things there. I like the idea of the maturity model and the pathway. In some respects, first, second and third party sort of does that in some ways, yet doesn't in other ways, but the point I think is that we need to be setting the

expectations of what the credibility should look like from the different organisations. And I'm not saying that that we have to spell it all out, but if we're saying that there needs to be credibility in the system and it needs to be trustworthy, then those delivering the credibility and the trustworthiness of whatever the product or the service is need to have an ability to demonstrate that they are doing the right thing. So, pointing to it in the right way through our digital space I think is very important and the criteria that we set is important in terms of the language that we use as well, because it's not only about the actual trustworthiness, it's about the perceived trustworthiness. And that's a difficult one to get hold of and I don't have particularly a lot of answers for this at the moment, but I think it's important we have the journey. I think pass/fail is very difficult because if you have pass/fail then why would someone even go into the process in the first place and put themselves up on pedestal as being a fail? But if we can have a system with a maturity pathway model that would suggest to people, you know where you are on your journey of these things. You now we've talked about partial and full assessments before as well, where there's a partial route for how you determine compliance, but maybe that we could set up a maturity sort of process that suggests what stage you are in your maturity. And then in the IWA 48 we put a table out, just to give an idea about maturity models and how you could demonstrate where you were on your journey and I think that might help. Not necessarily exactly that, but something of that nature would give people an indication of where they are. But I think it's about how we lay that out within the criteria to actually give that confidence and trust as people looking at the at the products and services.

NS Neil Savery 39:15

We're just all throwing thoughts on the table here and I do like the idea of maturity, but I think it's important to see maturity from two aspects and I think Alison may be alluding to this in her chat comment about the EU. So from what I'm hearing we're discussing maturity in the context of scheme owners and where they are on their journey, where some will have been involved for some time and they've got well-developed schemes and well-developed standards and operating procedures and all of those kinds of things we would expect in a in a mature sort of arrangement. But I think we also have to understand that there are governments that are also more

mature in their own journey of what they expect to be delivered and EU is obviously at the moment the benchmark because of the status of DPPS. So whilst Alison makes the comment that they've got concerns about enforcement and the expectations of the EU will be that the claims that are being made through the credentials that are being submitted as part of DPPs are going to be something that are reliable and presumably if they do audit, randomly audit some of those claims and credentials and find that there are shortcomings, let's say down the track there was some demonstrated relationship to the UNTP, that would go back to our original conversation about that would undermine the credibility of the UNTP.

So we've got governments at different levels of maturity and scheme owners,

NS

operators at different levels of maturity. So I think we've got to understand that. But then I just wanted to throw in the observation, I know I'm sounding like a broken record, about how we can potentially put a recommendation that at least points in the direction of a more structured arrangement into creating credible, trustworthy processes. Could we just focus on, for instance, those who want to make the claim that they are UNTP-Compliant because you you've pointed Brett to the fact that there are people making those claims now and they have no basis upon which to do that whatsoever. But clearly there's a benefit to people making those claims because it improves the credibility of what they're offering. So why don't we convert that into something that we can capitalize on and say, well, look, if you do want this, the way that you can get it is that if we had say, hypothetically, an arrangement with the IAF where the IAF set up a framework under which those scheme owners who want to claim UNTP-compliance they have to get some form of accreditation through an IAF-documented process. That way you're starting to use your tools to guide people or cause people to go down the pathway that we want to, without dictating that you must follow the entirety of the CASCO Toolbox process, which as we've discussed, isn't potentially going to be productive for us, but at least we can plug in that part that builds credibility for the UNTP process and in turn the credibility for those organisations that take the effort to demonstrate that they've gone through some process of demonstrating their capabilities.

FR

Figueiredo, Reinaldo 43:36

I mean, I think we have different path to achieve this, IAF or the new Global Accreditation Cooperation in my opinion is 1 path for this, but there are other paths with different structure where the output is credible as well. I think we cannot go to

one path and say look, this is your goal. I think we need to leave it open for different paths that provide credibility.



Brett Hyland 44:21

Well, I suppose I was going to say something similar. I hope that it came through in that slide that I that I circulated that we do have to think about the schemes versus the conformity assessment done to the scheme as different things.

While the conformity credential link to an endorsement around the conformity assessment, the scheme should separately be linking to an endorsement for the scheme. Here's that slide again, I know you've all seen it.

So Neil, when you talk about ISO CASCO, we really are in the bottom half of the of the slide that deals with conformity assessment and Ronaldo's contention is that it's too prescriptive to say you have to be accredited because there are quite credible peer assessment programs, the, Global Eco Label Network I think was one that people have mentioned, or the Sustainable Supply Chain Initiative, part of the Consumer Goods Forum, I think, which I may have garbled that, but there are quite widespread peer assessment programmes that deal with conformity assessment. But that isn't really about the scheme. The scheme's a different thing altogether.



Neil Savery 45:54

No and I accept that Brett but I'm throwing that in as an idea and I accept that there are other ways of demonstrating conformance, but my point was more that we could engage with one or more of those bodies to say that this is the exercise we're engaged in and this is the outcome we want to achieve, and it would be helpful if there was a methodology by which we could encourage people to go down a path. That would give credibility to them, what they're doing and the whole process. But just back on your slide, I I'm not focused specifically on the CAB. I'm talking about the accreditation of the schemes. Schemes get accredited too, not just the conformity bodies, and so the schemes at the start of the process can, depending on what sector of the economy you're in, in order for them to be accepted, have to be endorsed by an accreditation body.



Brett Hyland 47:07

Yeah, I think that's right. They are endorsed, that's the right term to IAF MD-25,, I

think that's quite correct. But I still don't think that that gives anyone confidence in any scheme standards that the scheme may have developed internally.

NS **Neil Savery** 47:29

Oh sure. But in terms of developing the standards, part of the process of endorsing those schemes is analyzing the methodologies that are used for developing criteria and standards within schemes. Anyway, I'm just trying to work my way through this, Brett, I think we're all wanting the same outcome.

 **Brett Hyland** 48:03

Yeah, I believe there's a path somewhere and if any group can find that path, I'm sure it can be found within our group mailing list. We have some extraordinary expertise here.

JT **Josh Taylor** 48:22

Thank you all. Super interesting discussion. One thing that I was reflecting on is that what we want to be pushing schemes towards is greater transparency and greater credibility. So to the extent that they're engaging in the UNTP and that they're engaging in that level of digitization process, that should be something that we're encouraging and I think then there is an additional claims control that UNTP could make around what you can say and what you need to have in place before you can say anything about having UNTP-aligned systems or what however you want to frame that, but to set the bar too high would discourage them to move in this direction, whereas we should be encouraging them to do so.

MC **Martyn Cole** 49:15

Yeah, I was just a little bit thrown by Josh's comment, not that I necessarily disagree, but I there are enough breadcrumbs here. I think my sense is, from the conversation that I've heard, we're relatively aligned or there seems to be alignment that some form of credentials or some form of mechanism to understand credibility, this is necessary to lend credibility to the work you're doing and its meaning. I'm interested in what Zach was saying about accessibility versus the strength of that credibility, you know that at some point you're going to have to negotiate as to what that starting point is and I think that also relates a little bit to that kind of maturity ladder and there is a little bit of a danger in maturity ladder in that this pass/fail by proxy, IE you just set it by time, you know you say at certain points in time we expect this. Or you

set it by volume or you know whatever parameter, you know certain sizes organization we expect this to be evidenced. So there are pass/fails by proxy through maturity assessments. You know I think one of the fundamentals of a maturity assessment scheme is how self-aware you know particular scheme is you know is it is able to identify its own failings. Is it able to actually identify its own route to improvement? I think that is another mechanism to identify maturity, but a foundational element to assessing maturity. But as I say, my sense is that there are enough breadcrumbs in in the conversation here that you've got the start of a framework.

FR **Figueiredo, Reinaldo** 50:57

I mean, one of the big problems is the content of the scheme. This is my view, based on where I work and the organizations and forums that we work with. I mean for us to achieve good scheme content, the scheme needs to have transparency, credibility and governance in how to develop the scheme because nobody wants like to critique the content of the scheme. So this is just the framework, the content is never considered in any paths that exist today, internationally or regional or national. They don't touch this the content. So maybe here we need to put some principles around this, which is reflected in the final results of all the conformity assessment activities.



Brett Hyland 52:17

Fortunately, I did press transcribe, so I'll be able to review the rich discussion that we've had. I have perceived a fair bit of support for the idea of a maturity model. You know, it's not really something that sits very well with me, you know, if something is not credible then I can't see the point in making allowance based on it being immature. I don't see really solves anything, but I would certainly defer to the collective expertise that's assembled here.

Given that we've got just a couple of minutes left and it's probably not worth starting another topic, can I ask if Matthias is still tuned into this, if you are tuned in, Matthias, do you have any thoughts?



MA **Matthias Altmann** 53:15

Well, first of all, yes, it was a very exciting conversation because I think we are really at the heart of what the UNTP is when we say it's a protocol that that lends transparency to the data it exchanges. Just one thought I had when working at the

OECD, we had the OECD alignment assessments and that involved a credibility assessment alongside an implementation assessment and an assessment of the actual text of the standard to see whether they are aligned, this is also something we could look into and I think they work already with ISEAL very well. So if you have ISEAL already in the room, I think we have an excellent partner in enhancing credibility. The moment is not convenient for me to think and talk too much. I just wanted to listen in and next time you will hear more from me.



Brett Hyland 54:19

Thank you so much, Matthias. I immediately like this idea of path of alignment and implementation.

Anyway, great insights today, it's been a very rich discussion. Any final thoughts from others before we call this a day?



Gideon Richards 55:00

Yeah, just one quick one on credibility. If you talk about maturity model, it's not the absolute credibility, it's credibility within what you're doing. So I think, you know, we could maybe think about that in terms of where you are in the stages, in terms of the principles and governance and things like that. And that would then give you, you know, a Level 1, 2 or 3, whatever, as a way of screening or qualifying what you are providing, so that might be something to think about.



Brett Hyland 55:48

So Gideon, is it maybe legitimate to say that, well, they're fairly low maturity because all they've done is to claim they do certain things and then the next stage might be, well they've been assessed for it but really no one knows much about the assessment body, and then lastly, they've been properly assessed by a globally recognized authority or benchmarking organization. I mean, I could go along with that. But if it was the case that they can't even self-declare to align with proper governance structures and criteria, why would UNTP want anything to do with them?



Gideon Richards 56:38

No, I think you're right, but I think it's the way you frame it. You know, there are parts of the ESG equation that are not mature in their own right, but you can put credibility to what you're saying. So for instance, if you're going to make a qualitative

statement, you could say a qualitative statement could come from your ChatGPT that you've dropped in a question and says, you know, how do we fit against everyone else and it spits out an answer. Or you could come along and say, we have peer reviewed data from this sector to give us an indication that actually we are in the middle of that that process and we are doing XY and Z to move ourselves along that. So there's ways and means of actually looking at what that credibility is within the position you are within your maturity. And so it's not just a case of thinking about the certification process, the accreditation process and the endorsement. I suppose it's more about the endorsement process we're talking about, if we're talking about schemes. Then you can be starting to think, well, it's not trying to do the whole world here and it's not going to provide all the good stuff, but it's good within what it's trying to do. And I think that's sort of part of what I'm trying to get out here is in terms of the maturity.



Brett Hyland 58:31

Well, of course, we've only started the conversation tonight. Admittedly, it's the third meeting that we've been discussing it, but I think we recognise that we're still at the start of a long conversation. Something that does bother me is that hearing some of these ideas about assessing maturity, it sounds like a lot of work for the UN. You know, we're going to have to be relying on external bodies to do the actual work, so we need to keep that in the back of our mind as we put these ideas forward. But look, thank you all, it's always a pleasure to deal with eminent experts such as yourselves. And I feel it's been a rewarding and rich conversation. I look forward to our next session. Thanks again.

● **Brett Hyland** stopped transcription